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GOING NOWHERE, SLOWLY: THE LONG
STRUGGLE OVER CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
AND SOME ATTEMPTS AT EXPLANATION AND
ALTERNATIVES
Robert F Bauer'
I. INTRODUCTION

The argument over campaign finance reform resembles a battle that
ebbs and flows, never shifting decisively in any one direction. Members
of one camp seldom appear impressed by the arguments of the other.
While the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 is now law, the era
of litigation over its provisions has just begun.' The outcome of these
lawsuits will materially affect the shape of the new law. They will
constitute only one phase of the counterattack on reform; another phase
will focus on the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) implementing
rules; and litigation over the new law is likely to be accompanied by still
another wave of litigation over new rules and over enforcement. What
will emerge from this fracas is anyone's guess. Experience with the
current law suggests that the results will bear little resemblance to
current expectations.
What are some of the sources of this unhappy state of affairs?
Certainly little comfort can be taken in the political arguments on either
side of the reform divide. Those arguments have not improved in clarity
or persuasiveness. The arguments are hampered by inconclusive
exchanges over the relative importance of free speech, on the one hand,
and the urgency of preventing big money corruption, on the other.2
Robert F. Bauer is Chair of the Political Law Group in the Washington, D.C. office of
Perkins Coie LLP. The author gratefully acknowledges the skillful research and editorial
assistance of Donna Lovecchio. Professor Roy Schotland and my colleagues Judy Corley,
Marc Elias, Ben Sharp, and Brian Svoboda read drafts and offered helpful comments and
raised pointed questions.
1.
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 181
(2002); see also McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-CV-582 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 27, 2002); NRA v.
FEC, No. 02-CV-581 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 27,2002).
For fairly typical arguments on both sides, see the Web sites of the Brennan
2.
Center, Brennan Center Documents on the Shays-Meehan!McCain-Feingold Debate,
available at http:/ibrennancenter.org/programs/prog-mccainfeinO3Ol.html (last visited
May 15, 2002) (stating that there are "mountains of evidence that 'large donors call the
tune,' and that voters are increasingly unwilling to 'take part in democratic governance."')
and the James Madison Center for Free Speech, available at http://www.
jamesmadisoncenter.org (last visited May 15, 2002) ("Though announced with the promise
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While media elites promote campaign finance reform, and various
charitable foundations fund continued efforts to produce it, the public
shows limited interest and rarely "votes" it.
' From time to time, an
"insurgent" candidate, such as John McCain or Ross Perot, may stress
campaign finance reform with considerable passion and effectiveness as
part of a broad attack on the established political order, but the issue
rarely holds its own in any public ranking of its priorities.
The constitutional debate has fared no better, foundering on the
longstanding, inconclusive disagreement about the nature of political
speech protected by the First Amendment.4 Buckley v. Valeo occupies
center stage in this debate, and it has done so for a quarter century.
Controversy over whether money is a form of speech proceeds along
familiar lines. These arguments have contributed to the development of
theoretical First Amendment free speech jurisprudence, but they have
had little to say about associative rights or effective political action and
therefore have had scant connection to political realities.
There is another source responsible for the lack of progress on this
issue. The struggle over campaign finance reform has coincided with a
period of pervasive changes in the structure of American political
competition.
Nonvoting has become chronic, accompanied by a
continued decline in party affiliation and loyalty.5 Interest groups have
entered into direct competition with parties, funding their own
advertising campaigns and broad-based voter mobilization efforts.6 New
political organizations, such as political action committees (PACs), and
,527s
, have supplied vehicles for participation outside the traditional
channels afforded by affiliation with candidates or parties.' Initiatives
and referenda have taken hold in some parts of the country as
alternatives to elections in which leaders are elected and charged with
of reducing the corrupting influence of big money, McCain-Feingold 2001 is instead a
broad attack on citizen participation in our democratic Republic. This bill shakes a fist at
the First Amendment; if passed, it is destined for a court-ordered funeral.").
3.
See, e.g., NBC News/Wall Street Journal: The Bush Administration, available at
http://nationaljoumal.com/members/polltrack/2002/todays/010128nbcwsj.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2002); Harris Political Ratings Poll, available at http://nationaljournal.com/
members/polltrack/2002/todays/030328harris.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2002).
4.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11 (1976).
5.
Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, As Turnout Falls, Apathy Emerges as Driving
Force, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,2000, at Al.
6.
OUTSIDE MONEY: SOFT MONEY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY IN THE 1998
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (David Magleby ed., 2000).
7.
Francis R. Hill, Softer Money: Exempt Organizations and Campaign Finance, 91
TAX NOTES 477 (2001).
8.
Morin & Deane, supra note 5.
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formulating legislation.9 In this environment, political actors are
preoccupied with adaptation and survival. Campaign finance reform
introduces a new source of instability and uncertainty by seeking to
impose and require political actors to adapt to additional rules of
political competition.
Accordingly, proposals for far-reaching reform in a political process
undergoing rapid, fundamental change will confront suspicion, confusion,
and stubborn disagreement. The stalemate is the product of intellectual
and argumentative stalemate, to be sure, but also of the sharply increased
uncertainties of electoral politics.
No solution is likely to command broad agreement. It may make
sense, however, to seek the broadest possible agreement on goals, by
avoiding controversial measures directed at corruption or voter equality
and emphasizing measures concerned with promoting voter
participation. This approach, which seeks to "level-up" rather than
"level-down," does not restrain speech or association, but relies on
incentives and the elimination of barriers. It respects rights of political
participation and association and recognizes that the vindication of rights
is impossible without some commitment of public resources. The
approach defends public funding and subsidies to reward and encourage
political engagement.
II. POLITICAL STALEMATE: THE PROBLEM OF "CRISIS"

Although the campaign finance debate has undergone many twists and
turns, the opposing camps have remained well defined. On one side are
those who insist that reform of the political process is urgently needed."
Those who support this side of the debate believe that Buckley v. Valeo
did not allow for remotely adequate government measures to address the
crisis of democracy brought on by escalating spending and rising special
On the other side are critics of an expanded
interest influence."
government role in the regulation of political money.1 2 Their view is that
the crisis posited by the supporters of reform is illusory at best, and at

DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE
9.
POWER OF MONEY (2000).

10. See Brennan Center, Brennan Center Documents on the Shays-Meehan/McCainFeingold Debate, available at http://brennancenter.org/programs/prog-mccain_ fein0301.
html (last visited May 15, 2002).
11. See id.
See, e.g., BRADLEY SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN
12.
FINANCE REFORM (2001).
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worst, simply reflects the desire to favor a particular party or point of
view by suppressing competing speech. 3
This debate has continued for more than a quarter century with little
progress. The parties' most extreme views appear irreconcilably
opposed. Efforts at striking a balance, as Buckley proposed to do, have
not yielded satisfactory results. It is less clear how the debate has
managed to be so unsatisfactory, when many of those engaged in it are
men and women of genuine talent and political commitment.
A large problem is the role of the argument about "crisis," about there
having occurred some alarming turn for the worse in electoral politics
traceable to uncontrolled spending. Reformers insist that there is such a
"crisis," and that it justifies measures that otherwise may limit the actions
or speech of political participants. 4 Skeptics vigorously deny "crisis,"
and by and large treat heavy spending for elections as nothing more than
the reflection of robust democratic life. "5 Neither side has benefited
from the crisis orientation of the argument.
Reform proponents have been led in the wrong direction in their
insistence on "crisis" in two ways. First, because they seem to concede
that the measures they propose are justified only by extreme
circumstances, they make the argument about crisis in extreme terms.
Knowledgeable activists declare that "what is going on in Washington
these days [is] large contributions buying access and influence in all
aspects of legislative decision-making,' 6 and that a failure to enact
reform preserves "the corrupt status quo."' 7 Claims of these kinds are
not typically directed against lobbyists.
The eminent political
philosopher, Ronald Dworkin has written that political fundraising today
is the "curse of American politics," progressing from mere "scandal" to a
"disaster."' 8 The distinguished political scientist, Frank Sorauf, believes
that with the advent of heavy independent spending and issue
13. See generally id.
14. Democracy 21, Noble Thoughts on the FEC and Soft Money Abuses, available at
http://www.democracy21 .org/index.asp?Type=BPR&SEC={A8B4DE06-6CC2-419D8A26-B5870F580B57]&DE={A003744B-4C63-4C67-9533-1121EBC959AF} (last visited
May 15, 2002).
15. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences
of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996).
16. Statement of Common Cause President Scott Harshbarger on Role of Soft
Money in Politics (Apr. 5, 2000), available at http://www.commoncause.org/
publications/april00/040500.htm.
17. Democracy 21 Statement on House Passage of Shays-Meehan Bill (Aug. 6,1998),
available at http://www.commondreams.org/pressreleases/Aug98/080698g.htm.
18. Ronald Dworkin, "The Curse of American Politics," The New York Review of
Books, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19.
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advertising, the "very stability" of the campaign finance systems has been
imperiled. 9 He writes that "[t]here is, in short, a damaging aura of
disease and weakness, an increasing expectation of failure, pervading
FECA's regulatory regime." ' 20
It is striking that the arguments by the critics of Buckley are similar in
character to the kind advanced in that case as a justification for
limitations on speech and association. Only the fact or appearance of
corruption would justify limitations; this corruption cited by the Buckley
Court was drawn from a true crisis, the Watergate scandal resulting in
the fall of the Nixon Administration. 2 Buckley critics appear to accept
the premise that nothing short of "scandal," "disgrace," or "disease" on
the scale will support the reversal of Buckley and institution of the
reforms that they have in mind. 22
The problem then is that their argument risks standing or falling on the
success of the claim about contemporary "crisis."
Generally the
argument has two parts-that there is a "crisis" in campaign finance,
largely associated with the ascendancy and control of special interests,
and that it is destroying the confidence of the American people in the
representative integrity of their government. 3 Both sides of the
argument, however, invite difficult questions; neither is self-evident nor
Frank J. Sorauf, What Buckley Wrought, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST
49-50 (E. Joshua
Rosenkranz ed., 1999).
20. Id. at 51.
21. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27, n.28.
22. The crisis posited by the reform debate has included another line of argument
about the quality of campaign discourse. Dworkin, supra note 18, at 19 (citing the effects
of "sound bite" television that results in "negative, witless, and condescending" messages).
Professor Dworkin excoriates the role of the press in offering, in the guise of campaign
reporting, "entertainment," not information or analysis, and blames news media
celebrities earning "huge salaries and lecture fees" and enjoying "public recognition that
often dwarfs that of the politicians they supposedly cover." Id. In other words, Professor
Dworkin is unhappy with the state of electoral politics in America. See id. This
frustration with the way campaigns are conducted has a wide following. "Negative"
campaigns have been the subject of separate academic study. See, e.g., KATHLEEN HALL
JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION, AND DEMOCRACY (1992). The
quality of the press' management of its responsibilities has received attention in numerous
books. See, e.g., TIMOTHY CROUSE, THE BOYS ON THE Bus (1973); PAUL TAYLOR, SEE
How THEY RUN: ELECTING THE PRESIDENT IN AN AGE OF MEDIOCRACY (1990); DR.
HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LOATHING: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL '72 (1973).
Campaign consultants are also unpopular. See, e.g., JULES WITCOVER, No WAY TO PICK
A PRESIDENT (1999). As discussed below, this disaffection with the electoral process
reflects a broader public disengagement from that process and has implications for the
direction of any discussion of political reform.
23. This crisis is similar to the corruption threat discussed in Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 45
(1976).
19.

AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS
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fully consistent with the available evidence. As a result, critics of reform
are able, with some ease, to launch a counter-attack on what one has
termed "faulty assumptions." 24 The stalemate begins.
Proponents of reform are well within reason, of course to argue that
spending is high and increasing, and to express concern that the level of
spending and the "arms race" for more money could adversely affect
both the quality of campaigns and the integrity of government. An
argument grounded in a claim of "crisis" demands more, however. Its
vulnerability is that it cannot supply what is missing. This point has been
conceded by at least one proponent of reform.28 Former Harvard
University President and Law School Dean, Derek Bok acknowledges,
upon review of the evidence, that the link between political money and
official action is "only a slight connection at best." 26 He writes, correctly,
that "[e]ven those who find that PAC contributions do produce
statistically significant changes in voting report that the effects are much
more modest than most popular accounts suggest." 27
Bok also addresses another argument about the existence of8
corruption - the use of money to buy "access" to decision-makers.
Here, too, he counsels that it is a "mistake" to overstate the problem,
because "access" should be reflected in voting outcomes, but generally it
is not."
Bok's study is notable for its care, candor, and willingness to concede
the point about crisis, while at the same time standing his ground in favor
of reform. 3° Bok argues for restrictions on party soft money, tighter
controls on independent spending, and additional resources for
challengers in the form of free mailings and television time.3 His
24. Smith, supra note 15, at 1057-58. Smith, now a Commissioner of the FEC, cites,
then sharply probes, the following assumptions, all of which are component parts of the
crisis argument: (1) that too much money is spent on campaigns; (2) that campaigns
funded with small contributions are more democratic; (3) that money buys elections; and
(4) that money is a corrupting influence on candidates. Id. For a critique of Professor
Smith's assumptions, see E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in "Faulty
Assumptions": A Response to ProfessorSmith's Critique of Campaign Finance Reform, 30
CONN. L. REv. 867 (1998).
25.
DEREK BOK, THE TROUBLE WITH GOVERNMENT (2001).
26. Id. at 83.
27. Id.
2& Id. (stating that interest groups contribute money to lawmakers to gain access to
them and for the opportunity to present arguments and information on issues important to
the interest group).
29. Id. at 83-84.
30. See generally id.
31. Id. at 265-66.
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proposal encourages states to experiment with programs for full and
partial public financing.32 He does not, unlike other proponents of
reform, rest his case for reform on a claim of crisis that posits the
encroaching power and control of special interests over public policy.33
The second argument suggests that without limitations, the public will
lose confidence in their government. This argument fares no better.
Surveys demonstrate an increasing distrust in government institutions,
politics, and politicians over the last three decades. 4 A lively debate
regarding the source of the distrust has ensued.35 Campaign finance
reform, however, continues to lag far behind other concerns in public
opinion surveys. 6 Even if many Americans perceive that special interest
groups buy special access and treatment from lawmakers, they seem to
care less than they say they do. A recent poll by the Pew Research
Center found that campaign finance reform ranked nineteen out of
twenty on a scale of national priorities.37 The authors of the poll
conclude that the campaign finance reform "is simply not a cause that
32. Id. at 265.
33. Scholars who are convinced of the salience of the crisis argument recognize, even
if indirectly, its limitations. In a recent review of the literature, Professor Richard
Briffault acknowledged that studies of the relationship between campaign contributions
and legislative behavior "have reached conflicting results concerning the extent to which
campaign contributions actually affect legislative votes." Richard Briffault, Public
Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 563, 579-80 (1999). He suggests
that the impact is greatest on votes where other voting cues are lacking - votes on
nonpartisan, low-visibility issues. Id. at 580. The link he establishes appears far from
substantial. But Professor Briffault displays its weakness still more in arguing that the real
impact of contributions lies in their subtle impact on access - that they can have an
impact on the wording of bills or decisions on scheduling. Id. He concedes that "[s]uch
influence is likely to be difficult to detect, measure, or police." Id. at 581. He also states,
however, that:
[P]olitical scientists who have studied the legislative process believe that it exists.
Certainly, it is hard to explain the hundreds of millions of dollars that organized
interest groups regularly pour into congressional campaigns unless such
politically sophisticated donors have good reason to believe they are getting
something for their money.
Id. This argument has moved in this way from a claim that money at least buys access, to
the acknowledgement that the effect is hard to detect but can be assumed on the basis of
the beliefs of political scientists. Whatever the merits of this position, as a matter of
political science belief, it is a weak foundation for limitations on constitutional rights of
speech and association.
34. See, e.g., WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOVERNMENT (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al.
eds., 1997).
35. Id. at 109-79.
36. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Why Americans Aren't Stirred
by Campaign Finance Reform, at http://www.people-press.org/aol32701.htm (last visited
Dec. 12, 2001).
37. Id.
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moves most Americans. ... "" It is difficult to make an argument about
a crisis of public confidence when Americans are not, in fact, moved by
its cause.39
Proponents of campaign finance reform, who build the case on "crisis,"
can expect sustained return fire on "faulty assumptions." As a result,
they have dug in hard on their positions, but they have not advanced very
far. By the same token, reform opponents show little openness to any
concern about the current state of democratic practice in the United
States. They may correctly dismiss overstated claims of crisis and
corruption, but they do not contend with evidence and associated
concerns that politicians and parties are compelled to raise ever
increasing sums of money, that many Americans do not vote, and
electoral politics, as it is currently practiced, holds out little hope of
rekindling their urge to do so. To the contrary, reform opponents appear
satisfied to leave politics to the market, allowing the money to flow
where it will and accepting a process characterized by low participation
and a frenetic concentration on fundraising and spending.
This difference accounts for the stalemate. It would not be a simple
matter to bridge the differences between someone passionately
concerned about public participation in the political process and another
who does not understand why it should matter. Reform opponents take
the additional step, just as their adversaries do, of overstating their case,
of converting their arguments into a polemic. Reform opponents
concede nothing to the cause of reform, but instead choose to treat it as a
cynical power play by political opponents, or as the source itself of
potential dangers to the political process. Thus a distinguished academic
critic of reform implausibly maintains that campaign finance reform does
Id.
Id. Even the number of Americans prepared to enlist in the cause of reform,
personal contributions and volunteer time, seems rather small when considered in
claims about crisis. See, e.g., ANDREW S. MCFARLAND, COMMON CAUSE:
LOBBYING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1984). For example, the membership of Common
Cause, a nonprofit, nonpartisan group that seeks to hold the government accountable, has
hardly changed. For the past twenty years its membership has remained at the quarter
million mark. Id. (detailing a history of the mid-eighties of the fluctuations in membership
of Common Cause). Other organizations committed to reform, like the Brennan Center
of New York University and the Center for Responsive Politics, are funded with grants
from large donors and charitable foundations, not from the dues paid by mass
memberships. While it is true that the Reform Party, under the leadership of Ross Perot,
traveled a certain distance on this argument, its high-water mark, the 1992 Presidential
election, occurred at a time when pubic anxiety over the economy was high. The Reform
Party's political capital has since been largely spent, and, indeed, the squabbling over its
agenda in the 2000 election appears to reflect the relative decline of political reform as a
cornerstone of its platform and electoral strategy.
38.
39.
through
light of
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all of the following: entrench the "status quo," promote influence
peddling, reduce accountability, and favor select elites, wealthy
4
0
candidates, and, remarkably, special interests over grassroots activity.
It would be most edifying, of course, to have in hand an answer some way of looking at the issue, which will largely reconcile the two
points of view and point the way to new ground. By its nature, the
debate does not make room for this result. Where would a compromise
lie?
A compromise could exist, but it would be a political compromise, like
McCain-Feingold, that seeks to impose new regulatory restraints while
reassuring those concerned with overreach. As one would expect of a
political compromise, however, it does not address the larger ideological
divide, but seeks instead to make it more palatable for moderates.
Because many supporters of this approach are prepared to compromise
core constitutional and political positions in the interests of practicality
- to produce for political reasons, some law - those observing the
process on both sides could come away with the uneasy feeling that
something unsavory, not ennobling, had been done. And for those with
strong objections to the reform movement, there is additional fear of
regulatory "creep" - McCain-Feingold offers less of a compromise and
more of an opening that may be exploited in coming years to broaden the
government's role in the political process. McCain-Feingold will mark
the next phase of the debate, but will not likely be the means by which it
is transcended or resolved. The legislation neither establishes a middle
ground for debate nor points in the direction where one may be found.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE
The constitutional debate over the current system of campaign finance
is also bogged down. The debate is characterized by repetitious
arguments over the extent of corruption wrought by special interests, on
the one hand, and the clash of proposals for reform with claims about the
protections of the First Amendment, on the other. In some sense, the
controversy has barely budged from Buckley. The muddled ferocity so
far afflicting the debate over campaigns has produced, as do all large
policy or political conflicts in this country, an appeal to the courts to
achieve what Congress so far has not. The courts, and particularly the
Supreme Court, have responded with halting attempts to referee the
dispute. There is little doubt that its efforts have yielded results for
particular cases, but overall, nothing even approaching a coherent
40.

Smith, supra note 15, at 1051.
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jurisprudence likely to endure or command acceptance. In one sense, the
Court does not deserve too harsh a rebuke for its shortcomings. It is
merely unable to rise in its decisions beyond the confusion and deadlock
characteristic of this debate. In another sense, the Court's decisions have
made matters worse by exacerbating, instead of redressing, the disorder.
Unfortunately, there is no doctrine that incorporates a defensible view
of politics and the role of the courts in refereeing the adoption of rules of
political competition. The Court has left the legislatures and litigants
with little idea of where constitutionally protected activity ends and
permissible government controls begin. The problem begins with the
Buckley case; it stands tall as a political compromise, but falls
dramatically short of a defensible constitutional construct for analyzing
the permissibility of government controls. As much as Buckley has been
pummeled for its shortcomings from all sides, it is worth considering yet
again the way in which it has failed the test of time.
When reconsidered, the case may be seen to have missed the mark in
its core assumptions about the political process. Its assumptions about
the difference between contributions and expenditures forced an
inadequate speech analysis to the forefront, failing to place more
emphasis on associative rights compromised by limits on political
money.4' The problem was compounded by the Court's insistence that
government interests could only be vindicated by establishing the fact or
appearance of corruption, without a clear statement of what this meant,
or how it could be done.
IV. BUCKLEY AND THE LOST CHANCE FOR ASSOCIATIvE RIGHTS

The Buckley Court deserves some credit for laying bare its theoretical
assumptions, which it set out in a section entitled "General Principles."
Here the Court argues the constitutional significance of the difference
between contributions and expenditures.42
While the Court
acknowledges the controlling concern with protecting both political
communication and association, the opinion accepts the view that the
right of association in contemporary jurisprudence is significant only "in
its instrumental capacity to protect free speech." 43 Thus, Buckley
concludes that association enhances advocacy, but it is not independently
significant. This is a critical choice made by the Court, when, in this
landmark case, it could have made another. The result is a distinction
41.
42.
43.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-23.
Id.
See id.
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between contributions and expenditures that seriously understates the
implications for political association in its own right.
This slighting of associative political rights produces general
considerations startlingly devoid of political reality. The Court suggested
that contribution limitations impose only a "marginal restriction" on
contributors' First Amendment rights, because a contribution constitutes
only a "general expression of support of the candidate and his views"
without communicating the "underlying basis for the support."" The
making of a contribution, the Court stated, is only "an undifferentiated,
symbolic act," and "[a]t most.., a very rough index of the intensity of
The speech right implicated here, the
the contributor's support ....
Court finds, is at best speech by proxy, that is, "speech by someone other
than the contributor." 6
This focus on the speech rights of the individual contributor reassures
the Court that any First Amendment infringements are tolerably limited,
because the contributor may turn to other avenues for more speech.47
The Court found that making a contribution is an important means of
expressing a viewpoint or position, but there are others. The contributor
may be a member of a political association, or she may "assist
personally" in an effort to elect particular candidates. 4 Hence, the
contributor may still participate in the political process, particularly with
a view toward supporting candidates, but she cannot spend much money
in this effort.
This conclusion appears odd enough in a decision emphasizing the
significance of money to effective speech, but by framing the decision in
these terms, with little attention to the associative rights of contributors,
the Court manages a superficial defense of the contribution/expenditure
distinction. If the speech of the contributor is of central importance, the
distinction is somewhat plausible. The contributor may find other ways
to speak, such as making "independent expenditures" expressly
advocating the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates, which
an individual may finance without limitation.49 In addition, it is possible
for the contributor to retain her association with a candidate or other
political organization within the constraints of contribution limits
"4

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 20-21.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
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inasmuch as she may volunteer services and maintain associative
memberships. 0
Speech, however, is not the paramount concern of many contributors
seeking to associate with others in a particular cause. They are seeking
to collaborate toward the fulfillment of a plan of political action. Their
views propel them on this course, but their efforts will be futile without
the active participation of others. Contributors allied with others in this
kind of effort are not so much preoccupied with speech, with the
expression of their views, as with effective organization.
This
organization, no less than speech, requires money, and it lies as much, if
not more, at the core of political activity.
By ignoring this consideration, the Court can suggest that the
limitations it proposes are of minor consequence for those associated
with the contributor, as well as for the contributors themselves. The
Court claims that contribution limits "merely ...require candidates and
political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons...
,,"This is not, however, a "merely" proposition, but a monumental one.
The contribution limits have required candidates and committees to
scour the political landscape for additional contributors and resources,
such as much-maligned "soft money." Thus, candidates and other
political organizations are forced to spend more time looking for funds.52
Moreover, when the search for funds expands, the emphasis shifts from
those who are like-minded, who will have given all they can early in the
campaign, to those who can be persuaded by other appeals to join a
cause to which they otherwise may be indifferent. Appeals to interests,
rather than conviction, seed the soil with corruption. These appeals are
the sort of bargain Congress found to threaten democratic governance
and are inconsistent with the Court's concern with the corruptive effect
of contributions.
It is fanciful to say that the limits on the amount of money given
directly to a candidate need not be evaluated under a strict scrutiny
analysis because the amount a donor provides directly to a candidate is in
part symbolic. But, the Court used this reasoning in 1974, only six years
after precisely those kinds of large contributions made it possible for the
insurgent candidate, Eugene McCarthy, to challenge the incumbent
president of his party, Lyndon Johnson. Donors supporting such a

50. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(i) (volunteer exemption); 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(D)
(membership organizations).
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22.
52. See id. at 26 n.27.
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candidate are not engaging in symbolic speech, but instead in very
practical political action that is dependent for its effectiveness on the size
of the amount donated. Nor, as a practical matter, are there meaningful
alternatives. Donors do not wish to make independent expenditures to
amplify their unfiltered views; they wish to support the campaign by
making resources available to the candidate's campaign (or the
candidate's party).53
Of course, the problem here is that the First Amendment does not
only protect speech, but it also protects political action (association), and
the Court has broadly defined the former while narrowly construing the
reach of the latter. With this analysis, the Court demonstrated that First
Amendment doctrine could supply some notions about individual
speech, but that it could not more integrally address and accommodate
the requirements of political action and association. The individual
speaker has been removed from her proper context, and the entire
constitutional analysis is welded to the requirements or limitations of
individual speech. The requirements of collective action, the very heart
of politics, receive the barest attention. It is curious that the
contribution/expenditure dichotomy has been attacked, by First
Amendment absolutists and reformers alike for either equating cash
donations with speech, or for not extending this equation far enough.
More striking has been the surreal character of the analysis appears
uninformed by any appreciation of the political process, the choices faced
by political actors, or the requirement of effective political activity in
association with others.
V. TRAPPED IN THE CONTRIBUTION/EXPENDITURE DICHOTOMY:
MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE AND THE COLORADO REPUBLICAN
CASES

Because the Court overlooked the associative rights at issue in
campaign regulation, it could not apply Buckley with coherent results to
cases where such rights were clearly presented. This was apparent, for
example, from the Court's decision in Massachusetts Citizens for Life,

Inc. (MCFL). 4 There, the Court was concerned with an incorporated
association, which was small in scale and modest in funding, that opposed
abortion rights.55 One of its activities, financed by "voluntary donations
53. See, e.g., Eddie Bernice Johnson, Election Reform Should Come First, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 2001, at A23 (stating that "it is important for... like-minded citizens to have
the opportunity to pool their resources in order to be heard").
54. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL).
55. Id. at 241-42.
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from 'members,' and from various fundraising activities," was to produce
voter guides. 6 The FEC had concluded that one particular guide, costing
just over $9,800, was structured to promote the election of particular
candidates and the defeat of others. 7 The Court could not disagree with
this assessment, but was also impressed with the raw associational values
presented on the facts of the case. To avoid the problem, the Court
made two moves, both of which preserved the superficial framework of
distinguishing "contributions" from "expenditures," but were motivated
in essence by a solicitude for associational rights.
First, the Court declared that the spending in question was
independent spending and therefore not constrained under the
limitations in Buckley)6 The real problem, however, was not the amount
of the spending-barely $10,000 was spent-but the fact that it was made
by a corporation that, at the time, was assumed to be barred by the FEC
from spending in connection with a federal election. Therefore, in its
second move, the Court established a separate constitutional allowance
for certain kinds of corporations. 9
The Court held that such
corporations could, unlike other organizations, make independent
expenditures if the following conditions were met: (1) they were formed
for political purposes; (2) they did not offer their members a financial
stake in their organization akin to that of shareholders; and (3) they did
not accept contributions from corporations or unions.6
The Court continued to treat the case as one involving speech: "[t]he
[government's] rationale for restricting core political speech in this case
is simply the desire for a bright-line rule. This hardly constitutes the
compelling state interest necessary to justify any infringement on First
Amendment freedom.",6' The government, to be fair, had not simply
fashioned a bright-line rule; it had applied a clear statutory prohibition
on corporate spending that, since 1907, has never distinguished one
corporation from another. Yet, the Court, using a corruption analysis,
was indirectly expressing what a clearer focus on association would have
more directly captured. The case presented a group of people of modest
means joining together to achieve collectively what any one of them
could not have done alone. Buckley, requiring an expenditure and

56.
57.
5&
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 242.
Id. at 244-45.
MCFL, 479 U.S. at 262-63.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 263 (emphasis in original).
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corruption analysis, made it hard for the Court to state convincingly what
was truly at issue.
The Court's doctrinal confusion was still more evident in its resolution
of two cases that unambiguously presented the associative value, the
Colorado Republican cases.62 In both cases, the Court strained to fit its
analysis within the Buckley contribution/expenditure dichotomy. In
Colorado Republican I, the Court held that the government could not
place limits on certain radio advertising by the party, because it was
conducted independently of their candidates." Neither the parties nor
the lower courts had considered this theory because it was assumed-and
because FEC rules provided-that parties could not claim independence
from their own candidates. 64 The Supreme Court, however, concluded
that if individuals, candidates, and ordinary political committees could
parties.6
spend independently, then the same right was fairly claimed by
The notion that a party might not wish to operate independently from its
candidates could not be accommodated by the Court's Buckley analysis.
The Court missed this element of the case because its speech analysis
operated as blinders. The Court examined whether the independent
spending right would encourage contributors to evade contribution limits
by funneling the contributions to candidates, through parties.66 The
Court dismissed the concern, insisting that contributors seeking to avoid
contribution limits "could spend the same amount of money (or more)
themselves more directly by making their own independent expenditures
promoting the candidate."67 Of course, this misses the issue. Under a
model emphasizing association rights, the contributor does not wish to
make the expenditures directly in the service of her own speech. The
contributor's goal is concerted political action, and her goal is satisfied
only by contributing to a pool created with others who share that goal.
The Court's opinion in Colorado Republican H opened with the same
analysis distinguishing contributions from expenditures. 68 The issue was
different, presented as the constitutionality of limits placed on
62. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (Colorado
Republican I); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001)
(ColoradoRepublican I).
63. ColoradoRepublican 1, 518 U.S. at 608.
64. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) (1995).
65. ColoradoRepublican 1,518 U.S. at 618.
66. Id. at 616-18.
67. Id. at 617.
68. ColoradoRepublican H,121 S.Ct. at 2358 ("Restraints on expenditures generally
curb more expressive and associational activity than limits on contributions do.") (citing
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,386-88 (2000)).
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expenditures by parties fully coordinated with their candidates. 69 The
statute provided that expenditures coordinated with candidates were
contributions. 7° The Court thus embarked on a Buckley analysis to
determine whether this type of contribution, from party to candidate,
71
occupied some privileged status inconsistent with mandated limits.
The Court's argument in Colorado Republican H was different from
that in MCFL. In MCFL, the Court kept its analysis on a technical
plane, elaborating the circumstances in which corporations could spend
independently.72 In Colorado Republican H, the Court inquired into
political realities and how "the power of money actually works in the
political structure." 73 By concerning itself with political "realities," the
Court expected to show that party contributions to candidates presented
the same danger of corruption as any other contribution. Realities, as
the Court understood them, led to the conclusion that corruption was a
distinct danger-many contributors, like political action committees,
used the parties as "conduits" for "contributions meant to place
candidates under obligation."74
Through this approach, the Court achieved a derogation of association
rights. Congress had concluded that parties occupied a special place
within the political universe of associations. For example, Congress
conferred special expenditure limits on parties. 75 These limits include the
right of national, state, and local party committees to transfer monies
without limit from one to the other. 76 The Court, held captive by the
Buckley dichotomy, found that political parties do not merit special
constitutional consideration, and that the relationship between the
donors and candidates was no different from the ones maintained by all
other political committees. 77 The parties had become super-PACs.
VI. ESTABLISHING CORRUPTION

The surreal nature of the Court's approach carries over from the
contribution/expenditure distinction to the requirements binding upon
legislatures to establish a compelling interest sufficient to override First
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 2356-57.
See 2 U.S.C. § 441.a(a)(7) (2000).
Colorado Republican 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2358-60.
MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986).
Colorado Republican I, 121 S. Ct. at 2363.
Id. at 2364.
2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (2000).
Id. § 441a(a)(4).
Colorado Republican 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2366.
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Amendment guarantees." In Buckley, the Court isolated only one
compelling interest-to prevent the appearance or fact of corruption.79
The Court walked into a trap from which it has yet to emerge. Of all the
interests considered-the interest in corruption, the equalization of
access to resources, and the need to free candidates from the burdens of
fundraising'°-the corruption rationale was the least susceptible to
rigorous and consistent judicial analysis.
Thus the Buckley Court could not establish a record of corruption. It
cited in a footnote the reports from the Watergate Select Committee
and, in doing so, revealed the profound confusion at the heart of the
approach.8 1 The Watergate Committee did not, in fact, turn up much in
the way of evidence of corrupt conduct, such as large private
contributions driving officeholders to act on official matters. The
committee's devastating findings unearthed political corruption of a
wholly different character: a systematic program of abuse of
constitutional power by the Executive Branch at war with the president's
2
enemies in the press, the opposition political party, and the media.
Since that time, the Court has been unable to define the nature of the
corruption that legislatures may prevent. Its efforts have passed through
three distinct phases. First, the Court allowed regulatory measures to
enforce the statute, without requiring each regulatory restriction to be
justified under the corruption rationale. Under this approach, the
regulations were considered useful supplements to the overall statutory
scheme." In the second phase, the Court began to require a full-blown
analysis of how restrictive measures served the anti-corruption
rationale. 4 Over this period, the Court seemed to suggest, and the lower
courts seemed to follow, a very limiting test for legislatures to meet."'
In its final phase, the Court reversed course and displayed a
remarkable and confused flexibility. This phase is most evident in Nixon
78. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (discussing strict scrutiny analysis
for government action that significantly interferes with a fundamental right).
79. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
80. Id. at 51 (citing interests).
81. Id. at 27 n.28.
82.

J. ANTHONY LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS

(1988). Of the six chapters outlining abuses of power, including crimes, committed by
members of the President's reelection committee, only one is devoted to political
fundraising, and much of it has little direct bearing on the shape of the FECA enacted the
year of Mr. Nixon's resignation. Id.
83. Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
84. See, e.g., MCFL, 479 U.S. 238,260-63 (1986).
85. See, e.g., FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 51:741

v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.s6 The Nixon Court affirmed

Buckley as it applied to sustain legislative contribution limits."" The
plaintiffs had questioned the basis for the limit set by Missouri, much as
one hears the complaint that the $1,000 limit established by federal law,
eroded by inflation, provides no constitutionally acceptable room for
political giving. 8 The Court, however, found that the legislature should
not be second-guessed." It accepted the most casual of materials as
ample proof of corruption or its appearance. 9° One piece of evidence was
a single affidavit from a state legislator who averred that large
contributions posed a serious threat to officeholder integrity. 9' The
Court also allowed the record to stand on a series of newspaper articles
reporting on scandals involving elected officials, including one limited to
the disclosure of allegations.92 Close observers of the Court, however,
could not fail to recall the manner in which the Court had dismissed the
proffer of newspaper articles in FEC v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm. 93

The government interest, as presented by the Court, could hardly have
seemed more trivial. By nature it was supposed to be compelling enough
to sufficiently override fundamental speech and associative rights. 94 In
practice, as presented by a case like Nixon, it barely rose above the level
of gossip and newspaper citations. 9 In a country known for its
established cynicism toward politics and politicians, 96 the Court had
invited, in the place of rigorous showing of government purpose, the
submission of standard anti-political pap. Just as the Court had limited
its appreciation of the political interests at stake by slighting associative
rights, so it failed to achieve a precise delineation of the countervailing
86.
87.

528 U.S. 377 (2000).
Id. at 395.

88. Id. at 383; see also Craig Engle, John DiLorenzo, Jr. & Charles Spies, Buckley
Over Time: A New Problem with Old ContributionLimits, 24 J. LEG. 207,213-16 (1998).
89. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 393-94.
90. Id. at 394-95.
91. Id. at 393.
92. Id.
93. 470 U.S. 480, 499-500 (1985) (holding that newspaper material and public opinion
polls insufficient to challenge the independence of groups spending to advocate the
election of a president).
94. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
95. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 393.

96.

FRANK SORAUF, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM

147 (1964).

Professor Sorauf wrote that "[i]n the most general way one can.., point to the widespread
American suspicion of and distaste for politics and politicians as the basic element of the
American political culture." Id.
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government interest.
constructed.

Neither side of the equation was properly

VII. THE CONFUSION WROUGHT BY BUCKLEY
The Court has seemed generally aware that something is missing in the
current state of its jurisprudence. As a result, various justices have
proposed doctrinal departures from the Buckley framework. Justice
Stevens has concluded that money is property, not speech, 7 while Justice
Breyer has developed a theory premised on the advisability of deference
to the legislature to resolve conflicts between competing constitutional
values. 98 Other justices have suggested that it might make sense to
dispense with Buckley altogether with the intention of allowing the
marketplace to rule. 9 While the Court continues to take cases, it is
making clear that it cannot offer a coherent, or consistent, rationale for
their decision. Arguments within the Court have the same lost, unhappy
quality of those taking place outside of it.
The confusion generated by Buckley becomes still more apparent
when its fruits are laid side-by-side with lines of other First Amendment
authority. Of particular interest for this purpose are the Court's
decisions, under other constitutional principles, establishing the rights of
political parties to control the selection of their nominee and limiting
their patronage opportunities. The law in these areas developed over
roughly the same period, from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, when FECA
and the Court's Buckley jurisprudence were evolving.
In protecting parties' rights to select their own candidates, the Court
found that party rules determining convention delegate qualification and
eligibility criteria superceded conflicting state law.°° An assertion of
state control would "seriously undercut or indeed destroy the
effectiveness of the National Party Convention as a concerted enterprise
,,'01
The Court upheld this principle again in Democratic Party of the
....
v. Wisconsin ex rel. Follette,cc by invalidating an attempt by
States
United
the state to force compliance by party convention delegates with the
result of a primary in which all voters, not only declared Democrats,
could participate.' 3 This line of authority was not focused on protecting
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Nixon, 528 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
ColoradoRepublican 11, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 2371-74 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 483 (1975).
Id. at 490.
450 U.S. 107 (1981).
Id. at 126.
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the purity of party activity, but on protecting the purity of the party's
own choice. Hence, in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,"' the
Court found that parties could also choose to open their primary
selection process to nonparty members."'
What accounted for the broad leeway afforded to parties in this area?
In holding that California could not force a blanket primary on parties,
which permitted all voters to vote for candidates from all parties, the
Court stressed in California Democratic Party v. Jones"" that "a corollary
of the right to associate is the right not to associate. ' ' The Court also
referred to this as the "right to exclude."' The Court offered, however,
a more affirmative formulation. There was no more important right of
parties than its right to select its nominee, who "becomes the party's
ambassador to the general electorate in winning it over to the party's
views. '' °9 Indeed, the Court identified a special place in the First
Amendment for this activity." ° In response, to the suggestion that
parties could still endorse their own candidates within an all party field,
the Court found that an endorsement "is simply no substitute for the
party members' ability to choose their own nominee."'' t
The Jones case was decided in 2000, four years after Colorado
Republican I and one year before ColoradoRepublican II. It is not easy
to reconcile the differing views reflected in these cases. The Jones case
provides a special place for parties in their selection of their candidates." 2
Yet, the Court's opinion in ColoradoRepublican I posits that parties may
operate independently from their candidates and only allows them to
spend liberally on their behalf, if they maintain their independence." 34
The Colorado Republican I decision makes the break even sharper.'
The opinion limits the contributions that parties may make to their
candidates, rejecting precisely the view that there is any special
relationship between party and candidate, much less an identity of
interest."5 The juxtaposition of Cousins and its progeny, with the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

479 U.S. 208 (1986).
Id. at 229.
530 U.S. 567 (2000).
Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 575.
ColoradoRepublican 1,518 U.S. 604,613-14 (1996).
ColoradoRepublican II, 121 S. Ct. 2351,2371 (2001).
Id.
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Buckley line of cases, shows how the Court is prepared to respect a
formal role of parties in naming nominees, while denying these
associations the most effective means of supporting them.
The patronage cases also run through the period that FECA and
Buckley make their appearance, beginning with the 1976 case of Elrod v.
Burns.116 In Elrod, the Court found that the Constitution did not permit
the firing of non-civil service employees based on their party affiliation."7
The Court cited a concern that employees would be coerced, for fear of
job reprisal, to declare views or support candidates inconsistent with
their preferences.11 8 Beyond the consequences to the individual exercise
of speech and association, the Court also identified a danger to the "free
functioning of the electoral process."" 9 At the heart of the decision was
the right to associate: "the First Amendment protects political
association as well as political expression."' 120 The Court cited in support
of that claim was none other than Buckley v. Valeo. 2'
The Court progressively expanded the core concern of Elrod. In
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,' 2 the Court upheld claims of
discrimination based on political affiliation alleged to have affected
hiring, promotion, transfer, and recall.' 3 The Court found that the
parties could build their loyalties less restrictively than through
patronage practices that "decidedly impair[] the elective process by
discouraging free political expression by public employees."' 2" By the
time the Court decided O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake'15 it
had extended these considerations to independent contractors. 26 Justice
Scalia, bitterly opposed to this development, declared that in overturning
years of patronage practice, the Court had "left the realm of law and
entered the domain of political science .... ,,127
The question then becomes: what political science? There were
different "party" interests at stake-the interest of the winning party in

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

427 U.S. 347 (1976).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 357 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 242 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
Id.
497 U.S. 62 (1990).
Id. at 79.
Id. at 75.
518 U.S. 712 (1996).
Id. at 726.
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 113 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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rewarding friends only with the spoils of victory,' 28 and the interest of the
losing one to protect against wholesale employment-related
discrimination. 9 Yet, the Court, though also using the language of
association, seemed more concerned with the individual "free political
expression" cited in Rutan.3 ° There was, to be sure, an associative claim
in these cases derived from the party affiliation at the root of the
discriminatory treatment. It seemed, however, ancillary in character,
much like the limited scope afforded association rights in Buckley. 3 '
Stated another way, the right of association protected by the Court in the
patronage cases was more the individual manifestation or expression of
the associative right. The broader institutional interest of the party,
which was actively represented by robust patronage practices failed to
carry the day.
By the end of the century, the parties could control the selection of
their nominees but were significantly limited in the support they could
provide them. The parties were also restricted in applying the public
resources they could control through patronage practices. Political
parties, as the leading associations in the constellation of organized
American politics, fared poorly in the constitutional jurisprudence.
Associative rights, a coherent conception of collective action to win
elections and hold power, fared poorly as well.
VIII. CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL CHANGE

It is not fair to say that the campaign finance debate has occurred in a
political vacuum, without reference to the actual experience of politics.
Participants in the debate have taken careful note of the increasing
amounts of money involved, as well as the tone and quality of the
manner in which campaigns are waged.'32 Those arguing for reform will
suggest that Americans, alienated by the role of money in politics, will
return to the fold only when it is reduced; while their opponents dispute
that the government should limit free speech rights or risk voter fraud
through activist measures to encourage voting.
The debate has been overwhelmed to a large extent by political
change. One large aspect of that change has been widespread
disengagement from the electoral process, reflected in chronic nonvoting.

12&
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 75.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
IF BUCKLEY FELL (E. Joshua Rosendranz ed., 1.999).
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Studies conclusively show that nonvoting does not stem from a rejection
of, or hypothesized alienation from, the political process, but from a lack
of interest in it.'33 While there is considerable disagreement about the
extent to which nonvoting Americans have flocked to other forms of
political activity in the alternative, few dispute the fact that many
choose not to vote.'35 This is a striking irony: in the middle of a strident
policy debate about the financing of election campaigns, a limited
number of Americans eligible to vote even care about them. It is also
clear that there is nothing evanescent about this migration from voting: it
has developed over a long period and has become a stable feature of
American political life. 36
Nonvoting is also related to the weakening identification with the
political parties.137 Both of the major parties now command significant
allegiance from roughly a third of the electorate, with the remaining third
consisting of those swing voters who are "easily attracted to independent

133. See

STEVEN

J. ROSENSTONE

&

JOHN

MARK

HANSEN,

MOBILIZATION,

212 (1993). The causes of decline "do
not include ... distrust toward government, or generalized alienation from the political
system." Id.; see also Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, As Turnout Falls,Apathy Emerges
as DrivingForce, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2000, at Al ("Most Americans do not reject voting
because they are angry," but "because they are bored by politics and indifferent to the
political process ....).
134. ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). Putnam argues that all forms of civic association have
declined, but other scholars have found otherwise. Id. at 48-64; see also ROSENSTONE &
HANSEN, supra note 133, at 1-2 (stating that Americans are "increasingly likely to take
part in other kinds of political activities"); SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND
EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 510, 530 (1995) (stating that
"[i]n short, participation in America is lively and varied," but "from the perspective of the
individual voter, going to the polls is the least effective way to take part").
135. In the case of presidential elections, voting participation outside the southern
United States has declined by roughly twenty-five percent in the last thirty-six years. Id.;
see also PUTNAM, supra note 134, at 32. It dropped thirteen percentage points between
1960 and 1980. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 133, at 1. In the 2000 presidential
election, neither candidate received more than a quarter of the votes of eligible
Americans. Press Release, Committee for the Study of the American Electorate,
Mobilization Propels Modest Turnout Increase GOP OutorganizesDemocrats Registration
Lower, Partiesin Trouble Reforms Fail to Boost Turnout (Aug. 31, 2001). While overall
turnout increased in the 2000 election, from forty-nine to 51.2 percent, one million fewer
eligible voters cast ballots than in 1992. Id. In general, turnout for the 2000 election was
the fourth lowest in American history. Id.
136. See Paul R. Abramson & John H. Aldrich, The Decline of ElectoralParticipation
in America, 76 AM. POL. SCt. REV. 502 (1982).
137. Id. at 520 (indicating that a decline in party loyalty is one of the factors playing a
major role in declining voter turnout); see also MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE
OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, 1952-1984 (1986).
PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
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candidates and third parties."'38 As a result, electoral competition
between the parties has become more volatile.'39 Neither party achieves
the upper-hand for a sustained period of time and each one spends
greater resources to reach fewer voters holding the balance of power.
Parties and candidates must also contend with new sources of
competition and different approaches, ranging beyond the electoral
process to the winning of political power. Organized interests have
experimented with various forms for achieving their political ends. In
the early years of the FECA, PACs loomed large.'" While PACs remain
a significant feature of organized activity by interests, more direct
intervention, involving unlimited soft money spending on advertising and
voter mobilization, have placed interests in direct competition with
parties. "' In the last few years, PACs seem to have been succeeded by
so-called "527s" engaged in much the same activity but with fewer (or
no) legal restrictions. 4 Interests also organize through aggressive use of
initiatives and referenda, seeking to pass "laws without government"
because they are a "far more effective way of achieving their ends than
the cumbersome process of supporting candidates for public office and
143
then lobbying them to pass or sign the measures they seek.'
One scholar has referred to this political order as "the new American
political system."' 44 This is questionable nomenclature, for it is conceded
that this system is characterized by atomized politics, in which "power
[is] more widely diffused.', 4 This fragmentation and diffuse makes for

138. JAMES W. CEASER & ANDREW W. BUSCH, THE PERFECT TIE, THE TRUE
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 4 (2001).
139. Id.
140. See Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Political Action
Committees, What Price PACs? (1984). In a background paper in that volume, noted
political scientist Frank Sorauf wrote that "[t]he role of PACs in campaign finance is now
so pervasive, and the attention they receive so extensive, that they have become the
centerpiece of a new devil theory of American politics." Id. at 3.
STORY OF THE

141. OUTSIDE MONEY (David B. Magleby ed., 2000).

Magleby's important study

shows how the interest groups have become steadily more sophisticated in the application
of their resources, focusing monies in closely competitive races with ground and mail
activities and not only in paid media. Id.at 8.
142 See Recent Legislation: Campaign Finance Reform - Issue Advocacy
Organizations - Congress Mandates Contribution and Expenditure Requirements for
Section 527 Organizations,An Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2209 (2001).
143. BRODER, supranote 9, at 2, 5.
144. THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (Anthony King ed., 1990).
145. Id. at 292, 298.
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less of a "system," and more of an environment of continuous change
and unpredictability.' 46
It is common to hear acute concern about these changes, including the
flight from the electoral process by millions of eligible voters and the
heavy fundraising and spending by parties and interests desperately
seeking a competitive foothold. Some commentators perceive the
emergence of a new political order as having much to offer.1 47 Michael
Schudson, for example, believes that a good citizen, who may not vote,
will monitor government action and intervene as her interests dictateY8
This citizen's language is that of rights, and she seeks their vindication as
much through the courthouse as through the polling place.1 49 The
"expansion of rights-consciousness," Schudson writes, "has made the
polling place less clearly the central act of political participation than it
once was." 50 This interest lies in "choice, autonomy, and power," not in
submission to the mass rituals of voting.'
Schudson is not alone in his
suggestion that politics has entered into what other commentators have
termed a.post-electoral order, an order where voting matters less to the
competition for political control and may be subordinate to, or may at
least share equal billing with, other avenues for achieving political
goals. 52
146. Sorauf, supra note 19, at 25. Professor Sorauf offers an interesting analysis of the
sources of political turbulence in the 1990s, resulting in intolerable strains on the existing
regulatory regime. Id. He cites a host of factors: increased electoral competitiveness,
sharp public distrust of politics and politicians, a rise in interest group activity, and a
volatile electorate with unstable party loyalties. Id.
147. See, e.g., MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CIVIL LIFE (1998).
148. Id. at 8.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 304.
152. BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS:
POLITICIANS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE PRESS FROM WATERGATE TO WHITEWATER

(1999). Ginsberg and Shefter view the struggle for political power as shifting away from
the mobilization of voters to other means of achieving direct control over governmental
institutions. Id. at 46. In this view, parties and politicians prefer to "compete for power
without engaging in full-scale popular mobilization." Id. John Gardner, founder of
Common Cause, wrote in his 1972 manifesto, Common Cause, that the "ballot isn't
enough," because on election day the vote is undone by organized special interest
lobbying. JOHN W. GARDNER, COMMON CAUSE 19-20 (1972). Conservative critics of the
electoral process have organized their program around term limits, intending to counteract
the effects of incumbent strongholds on their offices through manipulation of their many
advantages, some of which are even publicly funded. Id. A distinguished conservative
commentator, George Will, wrote that winning elections requires no more than "a market
niche" in which candidates "merchandise themselves with advertising paid for by venture
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Whether cited as a post-electoral order or a new American political
system, the rapid change in the political process has conditioned the
debate over proposals to reform campaign finance. Reform proposals
may embody admirable aspirations for the democratic process, but by
their nature, they call for changes in the rules of political competition.
For example, McCain-Feingold's restrictions on political party "soft
money" are certainly founded on public policy considerations, 153 but any
limitation on party "soft money" necessarily weakens the relative
competitive position of parties faced with interest group "soft money"
that funds the same persuasive tools of mail, television, and door-to-door
voter contact.
Attempts to limit independent interest group
"advertising" may cause concerns over the advantages it confers on labor
unions whose constitutionally protected communication with their
members would remain unrestricted.1 54 These are prominent, though not
exclusive, examples of the competitive impact of proposed reforms.
For political actors, however, the issue is not primarily whether any
particular change favors or disfavors them or their competitors. Of
greater concern to them is the introduction of new variables or unknowns
into an already unstable and unpredictable environment. Any campaign
regulation requires political actors to adapt their programs to new legal
requirements. Fortunately, for the competitors, the history of FECA
shows significant successful adaptation.'55 Yet, while it is widely assumed
that candidates, parties, and PACs will always manage to adapt, it is a
mistake to imagine that successful adaptation is a sure thing or free of
substantial costs and inefficiency. Participants in the political process
seek to plan their programs with some stable assumptions about the
ground of competition. 56 In an unstable environment, the task is difficult
capitalists (contributors) who invest in candidates. The return on this investment is access
to decision-makers and influence on legislation and other government actions." GEORGE
F.

WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS,
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 92 (1992).

TERM

LIMITS

AND

THE

RECOVERY

OF

153. ROBERT F. BAUER, SOFT MONEY, HARD LAW 2-3 (2002).
154. 148 Cong. Rec. S2124-25 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
155. Sorauf, supra note 19, at 12-15.
156. KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & PAUL WALDMAN, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT
2000: THE INSIDER'S VIEW 177 (2001). Professor Kathleen Hall Jamieson inquired as to
the possible use of soft money to produce a "bio ad" for Democratic nominee Al Gore.
Id. The dialogue proceeded as follows:
[BILL] KNAPP: You might be able to [run that kind of ad], but our lawyers
weren't comfortable with that.
JAMIESON: But didn't the Dole bio ad run as issue advocacy in '96?
KNAPP: It did. Yes, it did.
JAMIESON: Nobody sent anybody to jail. There's a lot of confusion.

2002]

Struggle Over CampaignFinanceReform

enough. When , in addition, it is proposed that fundamental rules of
competition are changed, active resistance can be expected. 57
With these considerations in mind, the debate over campaign finance
may be compared with the public and media reaction to gerrymandering.
One might assume that both would provoke active debate and dispute,
since both directly shape the grounds of political competition. While
campaign finance rules affect the resources available to the political
actors, redistricting even more radically determines the fundamental
competitiveness of a congressional or state legislative district. 58 With
precise map-making technologies, the parties are able to engineer
districts with the capacity to enhance dramatically their competitive
advantage. 59 This advantage does not vanish with the end of the next
election, but is built into the structure of the political districts. Parties
and candidates have been able to fund all of these redistricting activities
with unlimited soft money provided by the same donors and solicited for
regular campaign contributions. 6 Yet redistricting maneuvers, while
they generated legal contests, have not given rise to the hue and cry
characteristic of the debate over campaign finance reform.
The reasons lie in the relative parity in resources and reasonably
secure expectations shared by the combatants in redistricting
controversies, and in the role of the courts in quieting the anxieties of
KNAPP: Well, there isn't just confusion among scholars. There's confusion
among consultants.
Id. Later in the discussion, a representative of the Bush campaign stated that the "laws
[on issue advertising] don't seem to make much sense," and one of his colleagues
complained that "[I]t seems to put lawyers in charge of making political decisions." Id.
This discussion illustrates that, as some in the reform movement would claim, the law on
vital issues like issue advertising might accommodate almost any action, but to the
principal actors, its uncertainties are disturbing. There is a difference between attractive
loopholes and regulatory chaos: the former offers opportunities, while the latter presents
significant risks and can entail substantial costs.
157. This is not to rehash the familiar argument that the history of campaign finance
reform is a history of unintended consequences. Reforms have not always followed the
course intended by their sponsors. Yet, it is easier to assess and predict the course of such
reforms when the political landscape is well mapped. Where the map is being continually
revised, the introduction of still more uncertainty through the implementation of reforms
substantially adds to the costs of adaptation and its foreseeable success. Of course, the
fact that the effects of reforms are largely unknown and widely misjudged, makes matters
more difficult for the principal actors.
158. See generally Charles Cook, Politics: Safe Seats Stunning Skills of Lawmakers,
NAT'L J. (Dec. 1, 2001); Mary Clark Jalonick, Politics & Elections: Incumbent-Friendly
Remapping Plan Ready for Texas, CQ DAILY MONITOR (Nov. 15, 2001), at 14; MARK
MANMONIER, BUSHMANDERS AND BUSHWINKLES (2001).
159. See MANMONIER, supra note 158.
160. FEC Advisory Opinion Nos. 1981-35 and 1082-37.
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elites. Participants know that the Constitution compels the redrawing of
political boundaries. Each side of the gerrymandering debate has access
to the same technology and, because redistricting activities focus only on
states with significant population shifts, access to resources is by-andlarge equal. Gerrymandering disputes are submitted to the courts under
a body of established law. The law may change, as it has in racial
gerrymandering,16 1 but in each cycle of litigation, the parties argue their
positions, before a tribunal of accepted authority, on the basis of the
existing law.
The judiciary's role in reapportionment places accepted and
authoritative boundaries around redistricting disputes. As a result, while
it is understood that parties gerrymander to secure an advantage in
electoral competition, the federal courts referee disputes and determine
the abuses that require correction.'62 For this reason, the major
institutional press, which has been active in the critique of campaign
finance practices, follows redistricting controversies but accepts the
constitutional framework within which they are resolved. The world of
campaign finance, by contrast, is more like the popular image of the Wild
West. It is viewed as fundamentally lawless without generally accepted
rules or regulations.
IX. DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS FOR THE REFORM DEBATE
Should the reform cause be freed from its traditional mooring, so that
it is not hostage to claims and counterclaims about "corruption," it does
not follow that it is obsolete. In a period of great change in the political
process, characterized by massive defection from the electoral process
and changing roles for longstanding political institutions, a refocused
reform effort could lay the foundation for renewed voter engagement
and political participation. It might do so with two requirements for
effective reform that have been omitted from the central reform
proposals: (1) an infusion of public resources to promote political
engagement; and (2) attention to stabilizing the regulatory environment
to allow political actors to plan for the costs and risks of their actions.
X. THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES

The campaign finance reform debate has sidestepped the role of public
resources. The emphasis on corruption in this debate has made this
161. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,644-49 (1993).
162. See, e.g., Veith v. Pennsylvania, No. l:CV-01-2439, 2002 WL 530870 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 8, 2002).
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evasion possible. When politicians are wary about proposing "welfare"
or "food stamps" for politicians, it is an understandable temptation to
argue that true reform needs to attack corruption and is possible without
a penny of public resources. All that is needed, in this scheme, is a
prohibition on certain conduct. For example, reformers argue that
be
prohibitions on soft money and various maneuvers that might 163
corruption.
prevent
to
necessary
are
elections
into
it
route
to
attempted
The candidates will bear the costs of this approach through the fees paid
to lawyers and accountants to comply with the law, while the public,
without notice, will fund government enforcement.
The campaign against corruption does not address the requirements
for renewed political engagement. It takes the antiquated position that
because the most urgent problem facing democracy is corruption, the
political needs and aspirations of most citizens will be vindicated by
police action directed against special interests.'6 In this way, the anticorruption campaign avoids confronting the need for public resources to
underwrite the costs of more comprehensive reform.
Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein have demonstrated that the
enforcement of rights is impossible without accounting for, and meeting,
their costs. 65 It may be appropriate to limit some kinds of contributions
or expenditures, such as those made by corporations and unions, but
these measures leave open the question of how legitimate political action
should be funded. A telling example from recent history, the dilapidated
condition of American voting processes, illustrates how rights are
diminished when their true costs are not properly accounted for and
allocated. In the wake of the 2000 presidential election deadlock, serious
national attention was paid to the inadequate resources made available
over the years to election authorities.' 66 The National Commission for
Federal Election Reform, co-chaired by former Presidents Ford and
Carter, found that "[e]lection administrators get so few resources from

163. BAUER, supra note 153, at 8-10.
164. Democracy 21, Noble Thoughts on the FEC and Soft Money Abuses, available at
http://www.democracy2l.org/index.asp?Type=BPR&SEC=IA8B4DE06-6CC2-419D8A26-B5870F580B57}&DE=A003744B-4C63-4C67-9533-1121EBC959AF} (last visited
May 15,2002).
165. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999). Indeed, they argue that "[a] legal right exists, in reality, only
when and if it has budgetary costs." Id. at 19.
166. See, e.g., Help America Vote Act of 2001, H.R. 3295, 107th Cong. (2001).
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American governments that we do not even know how much is spent."' 67
By the best estimate, it would appear that counties responsible for the
basic costs of operating elections receive substantially less for this
purpose, by roughly ten-to-one, than they do for other core functions
such maintaining
parks, recreational programs, or waste disposal
168
programs.
Congress is now correctly addressing different ways to solve this
problem, including the consideration of different views of the role
properly taken by the federal government. Most proposals accept that
any solution will require a greater commitment of public resources. 69
The Senate, for example, passed in April 2002, an election reform bill
with a wide-ranging grant program for supporting states in the
implementation of voting system standards, the development of
computerized statewide voter registration lists, and the improvement of
voting systems and technology. 70 These measures recognize, on the basis
of bitter experience, that the right to vote does not exist in a vacuum and
that its exercise is secured only with a significant commitment of public
resources.
XI. THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES: PUBLICLY FUNDED CAMPAIGNS
The same considerations, favoring more resources for voting rights,
holds true for the array of political rights. Yet, beyond the debate over
voting processes and systems, there is little active concern for securing or
revitalizing the exercise of those other rights. Public financing of political
campaigns, for example, has faded from the most prominent reform
agenda, giving way to police measures like those in McCain-Feingold.
Even at the time of large budget surplus of the late 1990s, it was argued
that "[t]he American people hate, detest, and despise the notion that
their tax dollars would be used to fund political campaigns," and that
public funding programs like the one in place for presidential candidates
167. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, To ASSURE
PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 68 (2001). The Commission also
stated that "[t]he sums [spent] are literally too trivial to merit national accounting." Id.
16& Id.
169. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 114. As Holmes and Sunstein point out,
the cost of holding elections, though it is not highly visible in the public debate, is already
substantial. Id. In California, a statewide election costs anywhere between $40 and $50
million. Id. The production of voter guides alone may require millions of dollars in public
funds. Id.
170. Equal Protection of Voting Rights Act of 2001, S. 565, 107th Cong. (Mar. 19,
2001). Similar legislation has passed the House. Martin Luther King, Jr. Equal Protection
of Voting Rights Act of 2002, H.R. 3295, 107th Cong. (Apr. 11, 2002).
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are nothing more than "food stamps for politicians." 7' This was, of
course, never the point: the infusion of resources into political campaigns
does not primarily serve the interests of politicians, but instead serves the
interests of the public by allowing a robust political process liberated, to
some extent, from the burdens and preoccupations of private funding.
But in the broader political scheme of things, the attack on political
"food stamps" has been effective. Allied with the natural inclination of
politicians to offer voters more conventional, higher priority benefits
from the expenditure of tax dollars, this attack has shaped skepticism
about publicly funded campaign alternatives.
The political argument against public funding of campaigns is
bolstered by the belief that the presidential public financing scheme has
failed.'2 The controversy over soft money, which broke into public view
following President Clinton's and Republican nominee Dole's 1996
presidential campaigns, has significantly contributed to the eroding of
confidence in the process for campaign funding.'73 The reactions seem
somewhat overwrought and are hardly a basis for refusing to consider the
alternatives for invigorating political action with public resources.
Scholars who carefully review the record, such as Professors Anthony
Corrado and Richard Briffault, have produced measured and compelling
cases that public funding has accomplished more of its original objectives
than its detractors would admit. 7 4 Professor Corrado points out, for
example, that the eighty percent of those who check-off funds for use in
the public financing do not otherwise contribute to politics.' Hence, he
justifiably refers to this system as the "most popular form of
participation" in the American political process. 7 6 He also credits public
171. 147 Cong. Rec. S2630 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
172. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1735-38 (1999). Issacharoff and Karlan argued
that the public funding scheme has provided inadequate resources. Id. In doing so, the
scheme has exacerbated the private fundraising pressures associated with controversies
like those following the 1996 presidential election. Id. They are also concerned that
measures establishing various eligibility requirements have conferred advantages on major
political parties. Id. For another perspective on the failings of public funding, see Bradley
A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer Funded PoliticalCampaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 591-92 (1999).
173. See generally Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with
1996 Federal Election Campaigns, Final Report of the Comm. on Gov't Affairs, S. Rep.
No. 105-167 (1998).
174. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2000);
Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 583
(1999).
175. Corrado, supra note 174.
176. Id. at 59.
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funding with promoting the involvement of small donors and alleviating,
to some degree, the fundraising pressures on candidates., 7 Professor
Briffault defends public financing in broad theoretical terms, as "more
consistent with our political values" in enhancing competition, equalizing
citizen influence over the electoral process, and limiting the special
access of large donors to legislative decision-makers."'
Soft money may present regulatory challenges to the current public
funding rules, particularly those setting expenditure limits for
participating candidates, but its steep growth is, at bottom, a symptom of
a crisis of resources. It speaks less to the impossibility of designing a
successful public financing arrangement for presidential candidates and
political parties, and more to the inadequacy of the laws in providing for
adequate funding to meet the requirements of effective political action.
Because Congress has focused on policing measures, like those in
McCain-Feingold, it has committed very little serious attention to the
way the current arrangement might be more satisfactorily funded,
restructured, or even abolished, so that another, better version could be
erected in its place. Any question of extending the program to
congressional elections appears to have been put off indefinitely.
The recent Senate consideration of McCain-Feingold did produce an
innovative proposal, made by Senator Wellstone and others, to provide
for experimentation by the states with various public funding
alternatives.1 79 This proposal would have accomplished this end by
exempting experimentation from the operation of the FECA's
preemption provision, authorizing states to develop programs of public
funding that would limit contributions, expenditures, and the use by
candidates of their personal funds." The debate over this amendment to
McCain-Feingold was not edifying, eliciting complaints from opponents
about the use of "tax dollars... to elect public officials."'' The proposal
was defeated by a vote of sixty-four to thirty-six."
This was an
instructive moment in the debate over the bill; the Senate turned away a
provision intended to simply encourage some degree of creativity among
177. Id.
178. Briffault, supra note 174, at 565.
179. 147 Cong. Rec. S2619 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2001) (statement of Senator Wellstone).
The notion of turning over the reform efforts to the experimental ingenuities of the states
has received some attention in the literature. See, e.g. William P. Marshall, The Last Best
Chance of Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 335, 384-86 (2000) (explaining
how experimentation of campaign finance reform has recurred in several states).
180. 2 U.S.C. § 453 (2000).
181. 147 Cong. Rec. S2624 (daily ed. Mar. 21,2001) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
182 Id. at S2630.
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the states in devising programs of public support for the political
progress) 8 In this debate, the Senate concentrated on law enforcement
instead of the promotion of political engagement in an era of mass
political disengagement.'84 The disinclination of the Senate to address
this issue most likely flows from the perception that the public will not
tolerate "food stamps for politicians." If food stamps of this nature are
unpopular in a time of large budget surpluses, they will be still less so
when the fiscal ink has changed from black to red.
There is another problem with the attempt to use public financing
proposals as a means of shifting the debate away from police actions
concerned with corruption, and toward affirmative, publicly funded
measures to stimulate political engagement. Public funding proposals
are typically allied with the more traditional FECA objectives, such as
limiting fundraising and expenditures, because the resources made
available through them are intended as a mechanism for securing those
objectives.'9 Professor Briffault, for example, offers a brilliant defense of
public funding as superior to other reform approaches; but he still
structures his defense around its likely success to break the "tie between
private wealth and electoral influence" and to limit special access to
government for large donors.'F6 In other words, money matters, but its
significance is largely derivative. The principal interest lies in restricting
political activity to guard against its perceived abuses.
As a result, public funding schemes are caught up in the arguments
about the legitimacy of these objectives. If public funding proposals rest
on a concern with corruption, then their support will be shaky among
those skeptical about the existence of the problem. These difficulties
also lie in the path of those seeking to make the case on other disputable
claims, such as voter equality or the need to promote competition. In
each of these cases, good arguments may be made, but they remain the
subject of lively disagreement. The chance is slim that they will prevail
183. Id. (including commentary by Senator McConnell that such public funding would
mean "squander[ing] tax dollars in such an absurd way").
184. 147 Cong. Rec. S2619 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2001) (statement of Senator Wellstone).
The Wellstone debate was caught up precisely in the kind of fruitless exchange over
corruption and special interest money that had plagued the campaign finance debate in
previous years. See id. The amendment was presented as a way of addressing the "huge
imbalance of power where some people ... have too much wealth access and too many
people are left out," where "if you pay, you play." Id. The rebuttal generally focused on
the horrors of providing "food stamps" for politicians. See 147 Cong. Rec. S2630 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
185. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-109 (1976).
186. Briffault, supra note 174, at 578.
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by overcoming enough doubt about the use of resources for these rather
than other public purposes.
XII. THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES: "VOUCHER" PROPOSALS
In recent years, a somewhat different approach to public resources use
has involved vouchers. Significant proposals, which have not received
the public attention they deserve, have been made by Professors Bruce
Ackerman and Richard L. Hasen. 7 Each of these proposals suggests a
level-up approach to reform, described by Hasen as "increasing the
ability of those shut out of the political system to participate," rather
than the level-down approach of "decreasing the ability of those with
disproportionate political capital to exercise greater influence over the
political system."""
The proposals are similar in redirecting public funds from candidates
and political parties to voters, who could direct those funds as their
preferences dictated.'89 Voters could make payments with vouchers not
only directly to candidates, but also to political parties and other, nonparty political committees."' Under each proposal, these voucher
payments would largely define the universe of permissible electionrelated spending. 9 ' Independent expenditures would, for example, be

187. Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginningfor Campaign Finance,
in 4 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT 2, 3 (1993); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for
Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicChoice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers," 84
CAL. L. REV. 1,5 (1996).
188. Hasen, supra note 187, at 20; see also Joel L. Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, LevelUp Ratherthan Level-Down: Toward a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform," 1 J. L.
& POL. 211 (1984).
189. Hasen, supra note 187, at 22, 25 (explaining that voters may donate voucher
dollars to individual candidates, interest groups, or political parties, and providing an
example of how under the voucher plan, participants can create pamphlets "supporting or
opposing a candidate"); see also Ackerman, supra note 187, at 3-4 (emphasizing that how
the campaigns develop will be a "decision in the hands of the citizens of the United States,
where it belongs").
190. Hasen, supra note 187, at 22 (declaring that the interest groups that the public
selects may pursue whichever objectives the public prefers, from ideological to economic);
see also Ackerman, supra note 187, at 3-4 (commenting that those who hold vouchers
should "spend where they think it will do the most good" and that they should enjoy a
"broad range of choice" among interest groups in which they may invest vouchers).
191. Hasen, supra note 187, at 27-28 (noting the egalitarian nature of public funding
and how the public's choices in this funding shall reflect the weight of society's interests);
see also Ackerman, supra note 187, at 7 (voicing the public's "brute property intuition"
that the public should be able to spend their personal money to fund candidates just as
they use their money to buy possessions such as television sets).
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permissible, but only with voucher funding."2 Candidates with personal

wealth could not fund their campaigns with private, non-voucher
resources.193

Volunteers could continue to donate time under these

proposals, just as media could continue to editorialize for and against
particular candidates or parties.""
As Professor Ackerman states, voucher use along these lines allows for
some escape from "primitive regulatory thinking." '95 He proposes to
avoid undue preoccupations, typical of traditional reform proposals, by
limiting the use of private monies and supplying public funds, but
without the creation of an "imperial bureaucracy.""196 Refreshingly, he
acknowledges that spending limits necessarily reduce overall speechrelated activities, and also bump up hard against intuitive convictions
about the individual's right to spend personal funds as he or she

pleases

97

Professor Ackerman believes that committing public

resources and allowing voters to decide how they are used will create a

"new occasion for civic responsibility."'9 This approach, and that of
other voucher programs such as Professor Hasen's, makes a material
break from the main stream thinking about reform over the last twentyfive years.
It is not a complete break, however. Both Professors Ackerman and

Hasen justify their proposals, in part, by the likelihood that they will
better serve longstanding reform objectives.
Although Professor
Ackerman designed his program to inject more campaign funding into

the next presidential cycle than all presidential candidates spent in total
during 1992, he would still limit total spending to the amount of voucher
192. Hasen, supra note 187, at 23 (adding that "with limited exceptions, no private
fund may be used"); see also Ackerman, supra note 187, at 5 (stating that the Patriot
proposal "deprives [interest groups] of power based on the wealth of their clients").
193. Hasen, supra note 187, at 23 (declaring that many individuals and corporations
cannot use private funds to "bankroll their own campaigns"); see also Ackerman, supra
note 187, at 5 (elaborating that the financing of Perot's campaign would be measured in
voucher dollars rather than "green" dollars).
194. Hasen, supra note 187, at 24-26 (explaining how volunteer services are not
included as prohibited expenditures and how media endorsements are similarly excluded);
see also Ackerman, supra note 187, at 5 (declaring that the media would still be free to
comment on political matters and that volunteer services "should not be charged against
the campaign's budget").
195. Ackerman, supra note 187, at 2.
196. Id. at 3 (commenting that the Patriot system would provide "a much more
egalitarian distribution of financial power").
197. Id. at 2 (emphasizing that "money... makes effective speech possible," and that
certain candidates, such as Ross Perot, can "buy their way to the White House" with their
own private funds).
198. Id. at 3.
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money provided. '99 His program is aimed at reducing the influence of
large private wealth and at making it "tough to buy votes." ' Professor
Hasen defends his program by relying on four specific criteria, including
a requirement of egalitarianism under which his plan would be expected
to "redistribute political capital from small, cohesive groups to other
groups in proportion to their level of support in society." 21 Both
Ackerman and Hasen (though more the latter than the former) are
concerned that their plan not only renew political activity and
engagement, but that they do so while satisfying other, collateral
requirements.
These requirements are grounded in laudable expectations, such as
reducing corrupt conduct or enhancing effective government. They
result, all the same, in plans built on premises open to considerable
disagreement. Moreover, they provoke, like many reform plans, an
uneasiness in some critics about attempting through rules of competition
to engineer types of political processes.
The component of "engineering" is evident in the detailed elaboration
of Professor Ackerman's program, entitled "Patriot," which he has
developed at length with Professor Ian Ayres. 20 Patriot would provide
for an allocation of public monies, in amounts of $50 per voter, which
voters may use to fund their favored candidates.203 Second, it would
impose a requirement that all private monies must be donated
anonymously, so that the candidates cannot identify who supported them
and in what amounts.2M In this way, Patriot would encourage more active
involvement by voters,2 5 who would have decisions to make about the
use of their "Patriot" dollars, while its "secret donations booth," assuring
anonymous giving, would avert the dangers of quid pro quo bargains
between candidates and interests.t
199. Id. at 3.
200. Id. at 2.
201. Hasen, supra note 187, at 27. Hasen would also evaluate his plan in terms of its
impact on governance (judging by its contribution to stability and effective government),
its success as a "preference-aggregation mechanism," and its chance of enactment and
survival of constitutional scrutiny. Id
202. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS, A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
203. Id. at 4.
204. Id. at 6. As Ackerman and Ayres see it, this approach discards three misguided
assumptions of current campaign finance reform: that reform (1) requires limitations on
money, (2) demands publicly subsidized campaigns, and (3) must include full disclosure of
candidate's sources of financial support. Id. at 3-4.
205. Id. at 15.
206. Id. at 25.
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While Patriot is a new paradigm in one sense, it is less so in another,
for it is still grounded in a concern with the corruptive effect of political
money. Ackerman and Ayres are so committed to this view, that their
detailed exposition of Patriot does include an attempt to defend this
perspective on the role of money in politics. It is simply taken for
granted that "Big money is the problem,"21' 7 that it "scars" contemporary
politics by stripping away the "vital insulation" between democratic
politics and "economic privilege." 29
Moreover, while Ackerman and Ayres wish to avoid any "command
and control" bureaucratic approach, their own is not without a strong
element of government intervention, such as the prohibition on
disclosure of the amounts contributed by voter-donors to candidates.
The Patriot program is an innovative arrangement, but Ackerman and
Ayres correctly concede that "we stand before you as unrepentant social
engineers," concerned with structuring the political process to achieve
many of the longstanding goals of the reform movement. 2°9
Uneasiness with forms of "social engineering" in democratic politics
does not require an elaborate justification or defense. In the modern era,
campaign finance reform proposals have been remarkably consistent
with the partisan objectives, political preferences, and financial
circumstances of their sponsors.2" ° It is not surprising in light of that
history that each proposal, accompanied by explanations of the "values"
207. Id. at 14.
208. Id. at 25, 32.
209. Ackerman and Ayres' "social engineering" includes a complex response to the
possibility that individuals might show a candidate a cancelled check, purporting to reflect
a substantial contribution, when in fact the donor has subsequently revoked the
contribution (as the Patriot program would allow them to do). In other words, the donor
is faking the donation, while reaping the benefits of claiming credit for it with a candidate
in no position to check on the claim. The authors conclude that the "very biggest donors"
must "actually enter a physical donation booth if they wish to make a gift of more than
$10,000." The donor would not be compelled to make a contribution but if she did, she
could only do so within the booth, "within a physical setting that emphasizes the social
importance of anonymous giving." Id. at 104. This is truly "social engineering," with a
metaphysical twist.
210. See, e.g., ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE
MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW (1988). Robert Mutch has provided an
entertaining account of Democratic support for public financing in 1971 as inspired, at least
in part, by the party's unhappy financial condition after the 1968 elections. Id. For
example, among its debts, the Democratic party owed $1.5 million for phone service and
its creditor, AT&T, insisted that it pay an advance for service to be provided at its next
national convention in 1972 in Miami, Florida. Id. at 121. Even a supporter of public
subsidies, like the New York Times, could editorially acknowledge that "[o]nly now that
the Democrats are out of the White House and into debt does hard necessity concentrate
their minds on this problem [of campaign finance reform]." Id.
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it would promote or inappropriate conduct it would discourage, is met
with suspicion. The voucher plans, depending upon how they are
designed, will not entirely escape that problem and so they have not
altogether led the way out of stalemate.
XIII. THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES: TRUE LEVEL-UP
If the reform agenda were adjusted to meet other, less controversial,
concerns it might arouse less suspicion and make more sustained
progress. The contrast between the voting reform and campaign finance
reform debates is instructive on this point.2 '
While there are widely different views on how best to achieve voting
reform, few disagree that Americans should be afforded an opportunity
to vote and that their vote should be counted accurately. Campaign
finance reform, however, has run aground on disagreement over
fundamental principles. Yet, in a rapidly changing political system
characterized by, among other areas of concern, increased nonvoting and
political disengagement, the basis for some agreement on fundamental
objectives ought to be possible.
These objectives could be described as (1) participation, (2) access to
information, and (3) stability in the rules of competition. The first two,
participation and access to information, would require some commitment
of resources, because it difficult to see how, in their absence, much
headway could be made in fulfilling them. However, the resources
provided should not be a pretext for imposing spending limits or for
introducing or strengthening other restrictions. Instead, the subsidies
would be focused on encouraging political participation and association,
and they should be judged by their contribution to these goals. Of
course, any voucher or subsidy program would include eligibility criteria
and safeguards to assure their use for the lawful and intended purposes.
These are goals very different from the goals of limiting overall spending,
or avoiding the corruptive potential of private money, or reallocating
political resources from the wealthier to the less wealthy. The subsidies
under discussion here are designed for the purpose of facilitating and
promoting political engagement.
The third objective emphasizes clarity in the rules of competition in
order to allow political actors to plan their activities with some
Furthermore, such stability
reasonable certainty and efficiency.
211. See, e.g., Equal Protection of Voting Rights Act, S. 565, 107th Cong. (2001);
Bipartisan Federal Election Reform Act of 2001, S. 953, 107th Cong. (2001); Help
America Vote Act of 2001, H.R. 3295, 107th Cong. (2001).
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encourages participation by calming fears about liability. These changes
do not require major restructuring of the FEC, but rather measures to
improve the clarity, rationality, and predictability of its actions.
A. Participation
Measures to promote participation could take a number of forms.
Vouchers could play a central role. If used on an experimental basis,
these programs could be evaluated. All voting-age Americans could be
issued a voucher, modestly valued and usable for contributions to
candidates, parties, or other political committees.
The vouchers,
moreover, could range in total value, with a large sum of money
allocated to vouchers issued to registered voters, and still larger sums for
vouchers issued to "regular voters," who have voted in both primary and
general presidential elections in the last two election cycles. The use of
vouchers in this fashion would encourage participation by all eligible
Americans, but it would also reward those Americans who had
demonstrated a commitment to the voting process. It would also supply
the parties with incentives to register voters who could supply, as a result,
both votes and money to the parties that successfully courted them.
Participation could also be encouraged by issuing vouchers to political
parties for specific purposes associated with the successful
encouragement of citizen engagement. Parties today argue for "soft
money" as an essential resource for identifying and turning out voters. It
has helped
to supply
for this activity, but also at some
costandwit
gret
. some
... resources
212
cost and with great inefficiency.
A voucher issued for specific voter
registration and mobilization would be helpful to parties and would be
fully consistent with the goal of encouraging participation; but these
vouchers should be made available without onerous conditions. All
parties would be eligible to receive the vouchers, but the value of the
vouchers could vary according to formulas that take into account the
number of voters registered with a party and the number of new voters
each party successfully added to its rolls in the last cycle.
Parties should not have exclusive access to public resources.
Associations of citizens for political purposes are appropriately
212. See Sorauf, supra note 19, at 21-22. Sorauf, though troubled by the explosion in
soft money, correctly states that national committees transfer soft money to state parties
to "intensify voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives," and to assist state legislative
races that help with voter turnout. Id. at 22. This funding has played a large part in the
resurgence of political parties after a period of decline. See James W. Ceaser, Political
Parties-Declining, Stabilizing or Resurging, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
(Anthony King ed., 1990).
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promoted. Nonparty organizations, active in voter registration and
mobilization, should be able to qualify for public support, just as
organizations may qualify for tax exemption and deductions."' Political
committees that have become multi-candidate committees under the
campaign finance laws might qualify for subsidies for their cost of
operation, with the allowable amount depending upon the size of the
committee. One of the long-standing inequities in federal law permits
corporations and unions to fund these costs from their general treasuries,
while other political committees must do so only with hard, limited
money or with a mix of hard and soft money determined by complicated
formulas.2 14
B. Access to Information
Much has been made of the deteriorated condition of public discourse
in the United States. Limited news coverage, sound-bite politics, and
negative campaigning are cited as contributors to the vacuous din that
some accept as our public dialogue. 215 This is dangerous territory because
there is little room for wide agreement on what constitutes beneficial
discourse or on the means of bringing it about. A more expansive, varied
public dialogue may be taken, however, to have some bearing on the
quality and scope of citizen participation and engagement. By offering
voters, or citizens who are not yet voters, different chances to hear, in
different ways, about politics and public affairs, reforms designed for this
purpose may aid the overall effort to engage the citizenry in public life.
Public resources have a useful role to play in this effort. For example,
vouchers could be issued to parties for their use in coordinating town hall
meetings or arranging debates, featuring their candidates in major races.
The government could establish limits on the rates broadcast stations
charged for these purposes. Although the broadcast stations would not
be required to absorb all the costs, they would be required to discount
the applicable charges. Moreover, the parties, and their candidates,
would not be required to arrange these debates or meetings. Public
resources would be available to them as an incentive to do so. Yet
candidates and parties would have to answer for any unwillingness to
213. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); I.R.C. § 170.
214. There is little force to the objection that corporations and unions are more
restricted in the class of persons they solicit, even if they may more liberally fund their
costs of operation. This is a bargain they gladly accept. In any event, it seems unfair, and
is a true burden on association, for political committees to pay these increasing costs of
staying in business under financial conditions imposed by the federal government.
215. See, e.g., Dworkin supra note 18, at 19.
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take advantage of those resources and to thereby supply voters with the
events they would fund.
C Stable and PredictableEnforcement
Election laws have not so much collapsed, as they have become
steadily more confused and unpredictable. Political actors must still
make judgments about compliance. These judgments are costly. The
vagaries of enforcement impose direct burdens on political actors; they
operate as a restraint on engagement and as a disincentive to
participation.
Reform proposals in recent years have not addressed this issue with
much energy or imagination. Doubtless Congress will be concerned that
any adjustment to the enforcement machinery of the law will come under
attack as an attempt by members of Congress, most of whom are
candidates, to slip by accountability under the law. This is unfortunate.
Uncertain rules of competition, enforced unpredictably, do not implicate
principally the liability faced by any particular candidate, much less the
well-endowed and experienced class of candidates that include members
of Congress. The more serious threat is the one they pose to a stable,
predictable environment for conducting political activity, particularly in a
rapidly changing political system.
The FEC has done the best it could within the requirements of a
statute enacted at a different time and in a different political world. The
agency deserves more support from the government in conducting its
mission. Regulatory reform, directed toward enhancing the agency's
powers and enhancing penalties for violators, should emphasize a more
systematic, orderly development of the competition rules.
A possible example of reform would include establishing a standing
advisory committee
of politicians, political activists,
party
representatives, and scholars experienced in the campaign finance laws.
The committee would review the current body of rules and regulations to
determine their relevance and need for modernization, and the
committee would make recommendations for improvements. The
committee would have a membership selected by the Congress, the
President, and the political parties, but the number of congressional
members and party members should be limited. Although the committee
would only have reporting authority, its mandate could include a salutary
emphasis on the effect of agency regulation on citizen participation and
association. The committee's recommendations would highlight the
current state of the regulatory regime and stimulate some fresh ideas
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about the impact of government regulation on the energetic conduct of
political activity.
This same advisory committee could also routinely comment on
pending advisory opinion requests or proposals for rulemakings. Public
comments on pending opinions and rulemakings are currently sparse.
Those submitting comments, such as candidates, parties, or reform
organizations, do so from very defined perspectives and are motivated by
an understandable concern with advancing their interests and policy
agendas.
The comment process would benefit from the regular
participation of thoughtful observers concerned with the quality and
effect of regulation on the political process.
An alternative means to achieve regulatory reform would be to relax
the barriers to recovery of fees against the government when it is unable
to sustain its position in court for actions brought under the FECA. The
Equal 217
Access to Justice Act 16 has resulted in the award of fees in some
cases, but its requirements are generally difficult to meet. As the law
now stands, for example, courts may not find for litigants unless the
government has failed to "substantially justif[y]" its position. 2" The
government can typically defend on the grounds that the unsuccessfully
litigated issue was at least open to question, and that its decision to sue
was, in that sense, "substantially justified." This sort of defense has a bad
odor about it; for the concern with the use of the government's
enforcement powers is greatest when it forces political actors into the
courts on "open," "close," or controversial issues. Where political
activity and association are at issue, the government should initiate
litigation only where the issues are very clear, the constitutional
considerations are carefully evaluated, and its chances of success are
high. By reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act's standards for
political cases, the FEC could be compelled to determine its enforcement
priorities with greater sensitivity to political action and association. The
point is not to pay the lawyers but to discipline the government; those
concerned about the lawyers could be comforted with limitations on fees
and other safeguards against abuse.
Courts can also be guided in their contribution to stable FECA
interpretation and enforcement. The largest problem is the standard of
review. The Supreme Court has concluded that Congress intended for

216.
217.
(giving
218.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1994).
See, e.g., FEC v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Va. 1995)
an example of a group sued for their political activities).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994).
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the FEC to enjoy broad deference from judicial review. 219 This deference
does not apply where the issue under review is constitutional in nature.
In practice, however, the courts are uneasy about agency decisions that,
while not constitutional in nature, may significantly burden the activities
of political actors. 220 As a result, the courts have all too often paid lip
service to the agency's authority to construe its own statute, while finding
other ways to limit enforcement excess.2' It would be healthier for
FECA enforcement if the standard of review acknowledged the interest
of the courts in any government regulation of political activity and
openly allowed detailed review without undue deference. This revised
standard would also contribute to the goal of greater care by the FEC in
the cases it chooses to bring.
XIV. CONCLUSION
There is no reasonable suggestion that in interpretation or practice,
these objectives would elude partisan controversies or serious arguments
over the means of securing them. The most that can be hoped for is that
by attending to these concerns, and not to the traditional complaints
about corruption or equality, the controversies may be more contained,
the dialogue more productive and the tone more civil. To be sure, the
insistence on public subsidies will, all on its own, stir contention, even
fury; but those unhappy about this direction in the reform debate will
have to explain why it is possible to expend public money on all manners
of projects and policies, but not to stimulate and support citizen
engagement in the political process. Of course, the use of these
resources, focused in this way, may not break the stalemate, but it is a
positive step. It at least holds out the possibility of making things better
and stands little chance of making them worse.

219. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981). This is a
case in which the author of this Article represented the losing party. Id. at 28. The central
issue, involving the right of parties to transfer among one another special coordinated
expenditure authority under the FECA, has long passed into distant regulatory history.
See id. at 28 n.1. More importantly, the Court determined that Congress intended for the
courts to give the FEC, an expert agency, substantial deference in its construction of the
statute. Id. at 37. There is something peculiar, in a democracy, about a government
agency, considered an expert in politics, to have the authoritative construction of rules
regarding political competition.
220. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
221. See, e.g., FEC v. Harman, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1056-59 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(concurring in an agency's construction of a statute, but declining to permit the levying of
any fines or require refunds).
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